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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-2535 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
WILBUR SENAT,  
a/k/a  Wilby 
 
      Wilbur Senat, 
          Appellant  
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 3-13-cr-00558-002) 
District Judge: The Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 17, 2017) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________________ 
 
                                                            
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Wilbur Senat appeals his convictions for sex trafficking involving a child in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and transportation of a minor to engage in prostitution in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Senat argues that the District Court erred by (1) 
prohibiting cross-examination of the minor victim regarding her previous sexual 
encounters, (2) admitting evidence of other crimes Senat and others had committed, and 
(3) admitting a bus schedule into evidence without proper authentication. We reject each 
argument and affirm the convictions.  
I. 
 The facts of this case are both detailed and disturbing, and we will not repeat them 
all here. The broad strokes of the events that led to the conviction of Wilbur Senat for 
child trafficking and transportation are as follows. Senat coerced or lured fifteen-year-old 
girl S.C. from her home in Haverstraw, New York, where she lived with her aunt and 
uncle. After Senat threatened S.C.’s family, she consented to travel with Senat to 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, via New Jersey. In Philadelphia, Senat kept S.C. in a house 
with no electricity or running water, where Senat and his co-defendant forced S.C. to 
have sex for money. When she was uncooperative, she was beaten and chained to a pole 
in the basement. Eventually, another pimp, Samuel Verrier (or “Dre”), took S.C. and 
forced her to strip and have sex for money for several weeks. Police found S.C. when she 
was arrested in Bordentown, New Jersey, with Verrier and another pimp.  
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 Senat was subsequently arrested and ultimately found guilty of trafficking and 
transportation and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He appeals.1 
II. 
 Senat first argues that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause rights when he was prohibited from cross-examining minor victim 
S.C. regarding two prior allegations of rape. This argument is waived, and, alternatively, 
it fails on the merits.  
 Senat argues that in the past, S.C. falsely alleged that four individuals raped her: 
her father; Alex Alsope; Armante Smith; and an individual named Davante. The Court 
permitted cross as to two of those allegations (those against S.C.’s father and Alex 
Alsope) because S.C. admitted the allegations were false, and the government waived any 
objection. Regarding the latter two allegations, however, S.C. maintained that the 
allegations were true. Defense counsel responded that she was “just concerned about the 
lies” and thereafter did not pursue a Rule 412 hearing.2 In short, Senat agreed to the 
ruling he now challenges on appeal. His argument is therefore waived.3 
 Moreover, even if it had been preserved, Senat could not establish plain error.4  
The Confrontation Clause does not limit a district court’s “wide latitude . . . to impose 
                                                            
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
2 App. 90–91. 
3 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“[W]aiver is the ‘intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 464 (1938)). 
4 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
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reasonable limits on such cross-examination,” including limits based on “harassment, 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or 
only marginally relevant.”5 Here, evidence of S.C.’s allegations of rape would have had 
little probative value.6 Moreover, the District Court did allow Senat to disclose that S.C. 
had previously lied about being raped—evidence that supported his defense. 
Accordingly, the District Court committed no error in exercising its discretion to exclude 
evidence of S.C.’s unrelated sexual behavior pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 412.7  
 Senat next argues that the District Court committed plain error under Rule 404(b) 
by admitting evidence of his and other pimps’ prior crimes. We consider each in turn. 
 Senat argues that it was plain error to permit S.C. to testify about an incident in 
which she thought she heard Senat shoot another person. S.C. specifically testified that 
she was in a van with Senat and his friends when the van parked and Senat got out of the 
car. S.C. then heard two gunshots, and Senat ran back to the van. S.C. also testified that 
Senat told her later that she had “seen and heard something” she “wasn’t supposed to 
hear or see” and that if S.C. didn’t leave for Philadelphia with him he would hurt her and 
her family.8 Senat argues that there was “no purpose” in admitting this evidence and “the 
                                                            
5 United States v. John–Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 211 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States 
v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
6 See United States v. Tail, 459 F.3d 854, 860–61 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district 
court’s exclusion of a sexual abuse victim’s prior rape allegations that were not 
“demonstrably false” because they had “only limited probative value”). 
7 Id. at 861.  
8 App. 112. 
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evidence was not relevant to an issue in the trial.”9 We disagree.  
 While Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of “a crime, wrong, or 
other act” in order to show the character of the defendant,10 relevant evidence with a 
proper evidentiary purpose may be admitted.11 “If uncharged misconduct directly proves 
the charged offense, it is not evidence of some ‘other’ crime” under Rule 404(b).12 Here, 
the fact that S.C. heard gunshots that she thought Senat fired, coupled with Senat’s 
subsequent threats, demonstrate how Senat was able to “maintain[]” S.C. for the purpose 
of commercial sex under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Therefore, the Court did not commit plain 
error in allowing the admission of this evidence.13 
 Senat also argues that, under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403, the District Court 
improperly admitted S.C.’s testimony that after she was taken from Senat, other pimps 
forced her to strip and have sex for money before police returned her to her family.14 We 
again disagree.  
 As we have explained, “the purpose of Rule 404(b) is simply to keep from the jury 
                                                            
9 Appellant’s Br. 26.  
10 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 
11 United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2010). 
12 Id.  
13 Although we ultimately agree that this evidence was relevant to showing threats and 
coercion, we think it is just barely beyond the reach of Rule 404(b). Given other evidence 
that was admitted to show the nature of the relationship between S.C. and Senat, the 
District Court would have been well advised to bar evidence of this incident. 
Nevertheless, given our standard of review, we cannot conclude that it was plain error to 
allow it into evidence.  
14 Appellant’s Br. 25. 
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evidence that the defendant is prone to commit crimes or is otherwise a bad person.”15 
Because other pimps’ actions do not adversely reflect on Senat’s character, Rule 404(b) is 
not implicated here. In fact, defense counsel used evidence of Verrier’s actions to portray 
him as “the only real pimp in this case,” contrasting him with Senat, whom defense 
counsel portrayed as simply S.C.’s “ticket out of Haverstraw” to run away from her strict 
aunt and uncle.16  
 Nor did the Court commit plain error by failing to exclude the evidence under 
Rule 403 balancing. Criminal actions of other pimps are minimally prejudicial to Senat, 
and the testimony was relevant to why she was arrested and why she initially lied to the 
police.17 As we have explained, “when a trial court is not given the opportunity to 
exercise its discretion in striking the [Rule 403] balance, we will seldom find plain 
error.”18 This case is no exception. 
  Finally, Senat argues that the District Court erred when it admitted a Greyhound 
bus schedule into evidence to establish the route S.C. and Senat’s bus took to get from 
New York to Philadelphia.19 He contends that the bus schedule was not properly 
                                                            
15 Green, 617 F.3d at 249 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
16 App. 57, 572. 
17 See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997) (“People who hear a story 
interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be puzzled at the missing chapters, and jurors 
asked to rest a momentous decision on the story’s truth can feel put upon at being asked 
to take responsibility knowing that more could be said than they have heard.”). 
18 United States v. Gatto, 995 F.2d 449, 457 (3d Cir. 1993). 
19 Specifically, the bus schedule was evidence that Senat and S.C.’s bus was routed 
through New Jersey, where the case was brought. App. 425. Because the introduction of 
the schedule was objected to at trial, our review of the District Court’s interpretation of 
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authenticated because it was introduced through a government expert who “had no 
personal knowledge of the bus route.”20 Senat claims the witness was therefore “not 
qualified to testify regarding this issue.”21  
 This argument is frivolous. Rule 902(11) provides that “records of a regularly 
conducted activity” that meet the requirements of the “business record exception” in Rule 
803(6) “may be authenticated by way of a certificate from the records custodian.”22 Bus 
schedules are obviously records of a regularly conducted business activity under Rule 
803.23 Whether the bus actually followed the route on the schedule goes to the weight, 
not the admissibility, of the evidence.24 Therefore, the bus schedule was properly 
admitted with a certification under Rule 902(11), and it was not necessary that the 
witness introducing the document otherwise authenticate it.  
III. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the Federal Rules of Evidence is plenary. United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 408 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
20 Appellant’s Br. 33. 
21 Appellant’s Br. 29–30. 
22 Fed. R. Evid. 902(11). 
23 We also note that Senat likely waived any argument that the record does not meet the 
elements of Rule 803 based on defense counsel’s characterization of her objection at trial. 
App. 422 (“I understand it’s a business record. My objection was that I just didn’t think 
this was the appropriate person to be asking these question[s].”). 
24 See United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Any question as to 
the accuracy of the [records] . . . would have affected only the weight of the [records], not 
their admissibility.”). 
 
 
